January 31, 2018
Spectre and Meltdown in FreeBSD
Issues affecting most CPUs used in servers, desktops, laptops, and mobile devices are in the news. These hardware vulnerabilities, known by the code-names “Meltdown” and “Spectre”, allow malicious programs to read data to which they should not have access. This potentially includes credentials, cryptographic material, or other secrets. They were originally identified by a researcher from Google’s Project Zero, and were also independently discovered by researchers and academics from Cyberus Technology, Graz University of Technology, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Maryland, Rambus, the University of Adelaide and Data61.
These vulnerabilities affect many CPU architectures supported by FreeBSD, but the 64-bit x86 family of processors from Intel and AMD are the most widely used, and are a high priority for software changes to mitigate the effects of Meltdown and Spectre. In particular, the Meltdown issue affects Intel CPUs and may be used to extract secret data from the running kernel, and therefore, is the most important issue to address.
The FreeBSD Foundation collaborates with Intel, and under this relationship participated in a briefing to understand the details of these issues and plan the mitigations to be applied to the x86 architectures supported by FreeBSD. We also made arrangements to have FreeBSD’s security officer join me in the briefing. It is through the generous support of the Foundation’s donors that we are able to dedicate resources to focus on these issues on demand as they arise.
Foundation staff member Konstantin (Kostik) Belousov is an expert on FreeBSD’s Virtual Memory (VM) system as well as low-level x86 details, and is developing the x86 kernel mitigations for FreeBSD.
The mitigation for Meltdown is known as Page Table Isolation (PTI). Kostik created a PTI implementation which was initially committed in mid-January and is available in the FreeBSD-CURRENT development repository. This is the same approach used by the Linux kernel to mitigate Meltdown.
One of the drawbacks of the PTI mitigation is that it incurs a performance regression. Kostik recently reworked FreeBSD’s use of Process-Context Identifiers (PCID) in order to regain some of the performance loss incurred by PTI. This change is also now available in FreeBSD-CURRENT.
The issue known as Spectre comes in two variants, and variant 2 is the more troubling and pressing one. It may be mitigated in one of two ways: by using a technique called “retpoline” in the compiler, or by making use of a CPU feature introduced in a processor microcode update. Both options are under active development. Kostik’s change to implement the CPU-based mitigation is currently in review. Unfortunately, it introduces a significant performance penalty and alternatives are preferred, if available.
For most cases, the compiler-based retpoline mitigation is likely to be the chosen mitigation. Having switched to the Clang compiler for the base system and most of the ports collection some years ago, FreeBSD is well-positioned to deploy Clang-based mitigations. FreeBSD developer Dimitry Andric is spearheading the update of Clang/LLVM in FreeBSD to version 6.0 in anticipation of its official release; FreeBSD-CURRENT now includes an interim snapshot. I have been assisting with the import, particularly with respect to LLVM’s lld linker, and will support the integration of retpoline. This support is expected to be merged into FreeBSD in the coming weeks.
The Foundation’s co-op students have also participated in the response to these vulnerabilities. Mitchell Horne developed the patch to control the PTI mitigation default setting, while Arshan Khanifar benchmarked the performance impact of the in-progress mitigation patches. In addition, Arshan and Mitchell each developed changes to FreeBSD’s tool chain to support the full set of mitigations that will be applied.
These mitigations will continue be tested, benchmarked, and refined in FreeBSD-CURRENT before being merged into stable branches and then being made available as updates to FreeBSD releases. Details on the timing of these merges and releases will be shared as they become available.
I would like to acknowledge all of those in the FreeBSD community who have participated in FreeBSD’s response to Meltdown and Spectre, for testing, reviewing, and coordinating x86 mitigations, for developing mitigations for other processor architectures and for the Bhyve hypervisor, and for working on the toolchain-based mitigations.
– contributed by Ed Maste